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The interpretation of the past
It’s not at all easy to explain to a reader who is unaware of the social, cultural, 
and political reality of Catalonia how Catalonia has gradually turned in favor 
of independence over the past few years. To someone who’s new to the issue 
and not familiar with the historic or political background and who’s intrigued 
about the immediate causes of a wish to break up a state, the shift would 
probably seem capricious, if not opportunist. Indeed, the lack of knowledge 
and perspective on the internal and peculiar situation makes the external and 
more general aspects, the more obvious ones, the more stereotypical, seem 
“natural”. And when this “naturalness” doesn’t live up to snuff, it’s normal 
that instead of doubting if that stereotypical image was fictitious or forced, we 
demand explanations from those who revealed our ignorance.
The Catalans, right now, find ourselves in this predicament: to have 
to explain and justify that which is a profound reality of our country, and 
to defend it against stereotypes and misconceptions. Well, let’s get to it! You 
first have to remember that throughout the 20th century the Francoist dic-
tatorship assimilated us into an indivisible Spanish archetype all the while 
repressing any expression of cultural, linguistic, political, or economic differ-
ence. After the dictatorship, with the delicate Transition toward democracy, 
Catalonia’s national ambitions were again masked. Everyone pretended that 
they were resolved by a political model called the “Spain of the Autonomies”, 
the exaltation of which was necessary for consolidating the whole new dem-
ocratic structure. So, we had 40 years of Spanishness forced on us by the 
dictatorship followed by 30 more with the promise that the democratic con-
solidation of Spain—if carried out peacefully— would allow Catalonia to 
evolve toward more developed forms of self-government and respect for our 
national reality. In total, for more than 70 years, they have hidden from the 
outside world the fact that we are a “different” society. 
Yes, Catalonia is as much or more different than Scotland or Québec, 
but the political circumstances have hidden that fact. The old historic nation, 
the cultural and linguistic reality that is so different from Spain’s, the will 
to recover the political liberties that were lost in the War of Succession of 
1714—the true First World War—were all politically constrained by a wide 
regionalist nationalism and by a minority secessionism from an internal point 
of view, which internationally, only the culturally enlightened minorities were 
aware of.
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Therefore, the first thing that we need to make clear is that everything 
that is happening in Catalonia is not coming from an unexpected burst of 
political madness, from ethnic xenophobia, or selfish parsimony exacerbated 
by the current financial crisis, but rather is the product of the maturation of 
historic aspirations. A process that has been, certainly, expressed in many 
different ways over the years, and that in this latest phase, for reasons I will 
attempt to expose, has the majority leaning toward a wish for having state 
structures—and if possible, staying within Europe—achieved peacefully and 
through a process of democratic self-determination. This expression of major-
ity rule has not only surprised international public opinion, it also snuck 
up even on Spain, which has always belittled and underestimated Catalans’ 
national aspirations. And so it was that Spain concluded that the autonomic 
model established by the Constitution of 1978 did not only resolve the his-
toric aspirations of the Basques and Catalans, but trusted that these would be 
dissolved in a process of simple administrative decentralization.
The failure of the autonomic model
Nevertheless, that autonomic model that watered down the political ambi-
tions of two historic nations into 17 administrative regions has failed on var-
ious fronts. On the one hand, because it has satisfied neither the aspirations 
of the Basques nor those of the Catalans—to different degrees and for reasons 
that would take too long to explain here. And on the other because Spanish 
nationalism, which is profoundly centralist and homogenizing, felt threat-
ened by its own invention. The administrative decentralization introduced 
many economic and political inefficiencies into the system, and with good 
reason, the State felt weakened.
The resistance toward the autonomic process by the Spanish themselves 
could be felt from the very start—this was the principal motivation behind 
the coup d’état of 1981. In addition, in practice, legislation was passed with 
the express objective of invading the autonomies’ areas of jurisdiction so that 
the central government could take them back. But it’s true that the evolu-
tion from theory to practice of this anti-autonomism becomes most prevalent 
from 2000 on thanks to the conservative party, Partit Popular, and its presi-
dent, José María Aznar. From that point forward, the failure of the autonomic 
model is not speculation from the vantage point of so-called Catalan victim-
ization, but the pretext of a well-articulated program to take back established 
autonomic powers from several different statutes of autonomy.
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From the Catalan side, the ample awareness of the failure of the auto-
nomic model came a few years later. In 2004, when the Parliament of Cat-
alonia began to reform the Statute of 1979 in which lay the foundations of 
political autonomy, there was little general awareness of the model’s weakness 
in satisfying national expectations. At that point, the political parties were 
more aware of the weaknesses of the autonomies than the people were. When 
the reform was initiated, led by Pasqual Maragall, the objective was to man-
age to properly fit Catalonia into Spain by means of a federal system. For the 
CiU nationalists, the objective was the recognition of the Catalan national 
reality with special emphasis on equal treatment of the Catalan and Spanish 
 languages—as official languages with the same rights and obligations—and 
on the modification of the model of regional financing. In the end, the ERC 
independentists supported the reform of the Statute trusting that it would 
mean the beginning of a new transition that would lead toward their own 
clearly secessionist goals.
But the Spanish Congress, on which the ratification of the Statutory 
reform depended, eliminated most of the significant improvements that 
were proposed for self-government in 2006. What is worse, the Constitu-
tional Court ended up restrictively amending the new law, even though its 
 whittled-down version had already been passed by referendum and received 
a rather resigned affirmative vote. Awareness of the complete failure of the 
project, which began to be clear in 2006, was widespread by 2010. The Cat-
alan people leapfrogged the political class by demanding a new sovereigntist 
political framework. The final denouement arrived with the demonstration 
on September 11, 2012, the day that Catalonia celebrates its National Day.
At any rate, the part that is hardest to document in a brief and clear 
fashion is that which here I can only sustain as a hypothesis. And that is the 
fact that the triggering of secessionist feeling, which according to most rigor-
ous polls has reached between 55 and 60 percent of the voting population, 
has to do with an unrelenting process of humiliation since 2006. I say that 
it’s not easy to quickly demonstrate it because it has to do with a process 
of changing the emotional structure, fed especially by political provocations 
that often have more symbolic than legal force. Of course, it’s undeniable that 
the financial crisis has also more clearly revealed the unfair fiscal treatment—
the plundering, in political combat terms—and the mistreatment in public 
investments, a fact that has accompanied and reinforced this very notable 
political transformation.
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Perspectives for the future
It’s not hard to imagine, from a Catalan vantage point, the political collapse 
that this mainstream independentism has provoked in Spain. The reaction 
from the Spanish has been of the lowest democratic quality, unimaginable 
in any of the neighboring countries. The most common reactions have 
been threats and insults, and there has been no lack of dirty tricks. I won’t 
enter into details here either, because it’s not unlikely that this viscerality 
will become even more stark as the time for making a final decision gets 
closer. On the other hand, for the Catalans, what may be most surprising is 
the rather undramatic fashion in which the expectation of national eman-
cipation is being experienced by most of the population. That is, the vote 
against the recognition of the right to self-determination of the Catalans held 
on to only 20 percent of the votes in the last elections (on November 25, 
2012), and only 14 percent of the registered voters. One might even consider 
that this de- dramatization of the process’ repercussions might reveal a cer-
tain unawareness of the seriousness of the proposal. But the truth is that the 
majority of independentists believe that they are simply availing themselves 
of a democratic right that does not deserve—given their peaceful character—
the irritation with which it has been received. And suffice it to say that this 
lack of drama is most obvious among the youngest generations, who did not 
live through the Francoist past of the country, nor the transition to democ-
racy, and therefore haven’t developed any feelings of loyalty to a Spanish 
Constitution that they consider disloyal to Catalonia.
The whole situation is helped, of course, by the fact that the globaliza-
tion process, though it may seem paradoxical, makes the advantages of a large 
state and wide borders increasingly irrelevant. It’s clear that since the world is 
better and better connected, and more interdependent, independence poses 
no risk of isolation, especially in Europe where even physical borders are not 
an issue. It’s for that reason that, in this context, Catalans take for granted 
that their independence makes total sense within the European Union, and 
not just in its current form, but also if it should end up becoming the United 
States of Europe, with a similar structure to the United States. In fact, it’s little 
known that an independent Catalonia, would be ranked 13th by population 
among the 50 current states of the United States, and would occupy the 7th 
position of the 27 states of the European Union, or the 9th when ranked by 
GDP (according to the IMF, 2011). 
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The future of Catalonia is uncertain, and the fight is between the defense 
of the right of the state by the Spanish and the strength of the expression of 
the democratic will that many Catalans believe should be above and beyond 
any previous legality. We’ll find out what’s going to happen before two years 
are through.
